The work is systematic not just in the broad sweep of its subject matter, but in its defense of an economical set of substantive principles that informs each part of Dworkin's story and integrates them into a striking account of ethical life as a whole. Dworkin's central principles assert 1 the independence of moral judgments, 2 the unity of moral values, and 3 the interpretive character of these values. His principle of independence advances the claim that moral convictions are true or false, and are established as such by modes of reasoning that invoke other moral values in a framework that is independent of empirical, scientific, or metaphysical inquiry. Thus moral truths cannot be dislodged by empirical or metaphysical truths. Dworkin's principle of the unity of value advances an account of values e.
|Published (Last):||24 January 2019|
|PDF File Size:||20.41 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||10.83 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
Robert E. Rodes, Jr. Most users should sign in with their email address. If you originally registered with a username please use that to sign in. To purchase short term access, please sign in to your Oxford Academic account above. Don't already have an Oxford Academic account? Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide.
Sign In or Create an Account. Sign In. Advanced Search. Search Menu. Article Navigation. Close mobile search navigation Article Navigation. Volume Oxford Academic.
Google Scholar. Cite Cite Robert E. Select Format Select format. Permissions Icon Permissions. Article PDF first page preview. Issue Section:. You do not currently have access to this article. Download all figures. Sign in. You could not be signed in. Sign In Forgot password? Don't have an account? Sign in via your Institution Sign in. Purchase Subscription prices and ordering Short-term Access To purchase short term access, please sign in to your Oxford Academic account above.
This article is also available for rental through DeepDyve. View Metrics. Email alerts Article activity alert. Advance article alerts. New issue alert. Subject alert. Receive exclusive offers and updates from Oxford Academic. Citing articles via Google Scholar. Motives and Fiduciary Loyalty.
Justice for Hedgehogs
Would you like to tell us about a lower price? If you are a seller for this product, would you like to suggest updates through seller support? The fox knows many things, the Greeks said, but the hedgehog knows one big thing. In his most comprehensive work, Ronald Dworkin argues that value in all its forms is one big thing: that what truth is, life means, morality requires, and justice demands are different aspects of the same large question. He develops original theories on a great variety of issues very rarely considered in the same book: moral skepticism, literary, artistic, and historical interpretation, free will, ancient moral theory, being good and living well, liberty, equality, and law among many other topics. What we think about any one of these must stand up, eventually, to any argument we find compelling about the rest. Skepticism in all its forms-philosophical, cynical, or post-modern-threatens that unity.
Ronald Dworkin: 'We have a responsibility to live well'
We'd like to understand how you use our websites in order to improve them. Register your interest. In his book Justice for Hedgehogs, Ronald Dworkin makes a case for the view that genuine values cannot conflict and, moreover, that they are necessarily mutually supportive. I then set out the structure of his interpretive theory of value relations and present a case of value conflict which I think interpretivism cannot deal with. While, as Dworkin argues, there are no brute moral facts concerning values, moral psychology constrains the range of acceptable conceptions of values. Given the shortcomings of interpretivism I conclude that we should acknowledge that values may conflict. In his book Justice for Hedgehogs , Ronald Dworkin defends the view that genuine values cannot conflict and, moreover, that they are necessarily mutually supportive.
R onald Dworkin is wondering about what his friend Alfred Brendel does when he plays the piano. When he plays a great sonata, for example, he must think his interpretation is better than other interpretations or he wouldn't play it that way, mustn't he? We're having coffee in the vast, coolly modern sitting room of his four-storey Belgravia house. He reclines, suave and donnish, in his grey armchair. Dworkin smiles, then presses on asking and answering questions, leaving me incidental. He must think it's better and the question is why.
Robert E. Rodes, Jr. Most users should sign in with their email address. If you originally registered with a username please use that to sign in. To purchase short term access, please sign in to your Oxford Academic account above.