Many of our ebooks are available through library electronic resources including these platforms:. Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. This book ties together material on what economists should learn from auction theory, and on what auction theorists should learn from practical experience in auction design.
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Would you like to tell us about a lower price? If you are a seller for this product, would you like to suggest updates through seller support? This book ties together material on what economists should learn from auction theory, and on what auction theorists should learn from practical experience in auction design. Myerson, University of Chicago. His emphasis in recent years on some of the more practical aspects of the theory--how to attract bidders, how to avoid collusion, how to think about government policy goals in designing public auctions--is particularly innovative.
Klemperer's work will be very influential in the coming years. Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts.
Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how auction theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application.
Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of auction theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes.
Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in auctions and their role in economics. Read more Read less. Review "As a leader in auction-theory research and as a leading practitioner of auction design, Paul Klemperer is the best person to write the definitive book on auctions in theory and practice. Myerson, University of Chicago; "Paul Klemperer is one of the leaders in auction design worldwide.
His emphasis in recent years on some of the more practical aspects of the theory - how to attract bidders, how to avoid collusion, how to think about government policy goals in designing public auctions - is particularly innovative. Myerson, University of Chicago "Paul Klemperer is one of the leaders in auction design worldwide.
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Most helpful customer reviews on Amazon. Verified Purchase. This is a great book on Auction Theory and every auctioneer should have one.
I think that it should be in every auctioneer's library. In this book he reviews auction design both theoretically and in practice - the two perspectives turn out to be very different. Chapter 1 is a survey of auction theory. The author begins by identifying four types of auction: the English type of open ascending bids, the Dutch auction using descending bids where the first bidder wins, the first-price sealed-bid auction where the highest bidder wins and pays their own bid price, and the second-price sealed-bid auction the Vickrey auction where the highest bidder wins, but pays the amount bid by the second-highest bidder.
If the latter seems counter-intuitive, note that in the English auction, the winner also pays an amount set by the second-highest bidder the last person to drop out. Note also that the Dutch auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction are equivalent.
Another important distinction is between private-value auctions, where each bidder has their own, invariant valuation of the object s being auctioned, and common-value auctions, where bidders might alter their valuations depending on signals i. The key result in auction theory is the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, which states that all the standard auction methods, under certain plausible conditions, generate the same revenues. This accounts for the fact that no one method of conducting auctions has displaced all the others.
However, practical considerations often favor one kind of auction design over another, and this is analyzed extensively later in the book.
Chapter 1 finishes with a mathematical appendix which proves some of the main results plus some questions and answers from the Oxford University MPhil economics examination. Chapter 3 is a detailed guide to auction design. Auction theory is about mathematical models and their properties.
Auctions in the real world are competitions where real money is at stake and any and all tactics will be employed to win. Examples are given of extraordinary behavior by bidders which succeeded in effectively wrecking auctions as revenue-generating vehicles.
He also emphasises, with examples, that political realities can negate even the best auction design, if the designer is naive and doesn't take politics into account in advance. Chapter 5 gives an overview of the European 3G spectrum auctions, which ranged from brilliantly successful to absolute disasters, while chapter 6 explains in great detail exactly how the UK auction perhaps the most successful was designed.
This chapter is extremely insightful in indicating how many general economic intuitions have to be employed, over and above the specific insights of auction theory, to get a design which can resist the best efforts of the bidders to sabotage its effectiveness.
Not so. Overall, this book succeeds in creating in the non-economist reader a sense that they understand the basic terrain of auctions - what they are about - although there is clearly a much deeper set of theoretical results underpinning this map of the territory. The chapters tend to be quite repetitive, but that can help offset Klemperer's use of jargon whenever he gets into conceptual analysis.
It looks as though he doesn't know he's doing it, and that the people who reviewed it are his colleagues who use this stuff every day and didn't notice either. With a small amount of additional explanation to clarify the use of terms, much of the conceptual analysis would have been more accessible. The alternative is to read the book twice! Go to Amazon. Back to top. Get to Know Us. Shopbop Designer Fashion Brands.
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Auctions: Theory and Practice
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Auctions : theory and practice / Paul Klemperer.
What's a fair price? What's the right price? Truly, it all depends on who's buying and selling. In auctions, where the seller doesn't set the price, is a fairer price paid?